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Analytic Thinking Does Not Reduce Religious Belief in Argentine University Experiments

5/6/2026, 8:09:59 PM

Study Overview: Testing the Analytic–Faith Link

Researchers from the Universidad Nacional del Sur conducted two preregistered experiments with Argentine university students. After an effective “debiasing training” task that modestly raised scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, participants completed questionnaires on intuitive and contextualized religious beliefs. Across both studies—455 participants in the pilot and 938 in the larger trial—no measurable difference in self-reported religiosity emerged between the analytical-thinking condition and the control condition.

Background: Prior Claims of a Cognitive–Faith Trade-off

Earlier work in the cognitive science of religion posited that engaging the slow, analytical reasoning system suppresses fast, intuitive processes that underlie religious belief. Some experiments reported that logical priming lowered reported faith, while others suggested the opposite—logical tasks sometimes increased religiosity. These mixed outcomes have fueled a persistent hypothesis that analytical thinking directly diminishes religious conviction.

Researchers and Institutional Context

The study, titled “Assessing the Effect of Increased Analytic Thinking on Religious Beliefs,” was authored by doctoral candidate Luz Acera Martini and collaborator Esteban Freidin. Both scholars are affiliated with the Universidad Nacional del Sur in Argentina, and the findings were published in *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*.

Methodology and Sample

  • Pilot study: 455 Spanish-speaking university students were randomly assigned to (1) a scrambled-sentence reasoning task, (2) a debiasing training task, or (3) a control description task. Only the debiasing training improved Cognitive Reflection Test performance.
  • Main study: 938 students from diverse academic disciplines were assigned to either the debiasing training or a no-task control. Religious belief was measured with two scales: (a) intuitive faith and supernatural thoughts, and (b) contextualized judgments about divine intervention. Additional variables—need for cognition, science-religion worldview, and metacognitive certainty—were recorded.

Findings: No Impact of Analytic Priming on Faith

Statistical analyses indicated that the analytical intervention produced effect sizes essentially equal to zero for both belief measures. Moderation analyses showed that participants’ need for cognition, science-religion compatibility views, or certainty about faith did not alter this null effect. The uniform lack of change persisted across the entire sample.

Official Statements from the Researchers

Acera Martini emphasized that the results challenge simplistic headlines linking analytic thought to reduced faith, noting that short-term analytical priming does not act as a “magic switch” for belief. Both authors highlighted the importance of publishing null findings and of using open-science practices, such as preregistration, to clarify the reliability of psychological effects.

Criticism & Opposition: Earlier Studies Reporting Effects

The new null results contrast with prior experimental reports that claimed logical tasks either lowered religiosity or, in some cases, heightened it. Those earlier studies formed the basis of the widely cited hypothesis that analytical cognition suppresses religious intuition.

Conflicting Reports & Gaps

The discrepancy between past positive findings and the present null outcome underscores methodological variability in the field. Limitations of the current work include reliance on university students—who generally exhibit higher baseline analytical ability—and a modest increase in analytical thinking produced by the debiasing task. Cultural specificity to Argentine students may also affect generalizability.

Verbatim Quotes

  • “This work is part of my doctoral thesis project, where I explore the relationship between reasoning and religious beliefs from the perspective of the cognitive science of religion,” — Luz Acera Martini, Doctoral Candidate
  • “We felt these were essential for establishing clearer relationships between these variables, moving beyond the typical correlational finding: the negative association between an analytical cognitive style and religious belief,” — Luz Acera Martini, Researcher
  • “Ultimately, our findings suggest that the link between how we think and what we believe is far more complex than simplistic headlines often suggest,” — Luz Acera Martini, Lead Author
  • “For the average person, this means that ‘thinking more analytically’ is not a magic switch that immediately or easily changes a person’s religious beliefs, at least not in the way it has often been portrayed,” — Luz Acera Martini, Researcher
  • “It is also crucial to normalize the publication of null results (where no direct positive effect is found) which has become much more transparent thanks to pre-registered reports,” — Luz Acera Martini, Co-author

What’s Next: Future Directions

The authors propose extending the paradigm to younger populations to examine whether analytical thinking influences belief formation during childhood or adolescence. They also suggest exploring additional moderators—such as communal religious practices or stronger analytical interventions—to determine conditions under which cognition and faith might interact.