Russia’s Growing Anxiety Over Western Critical Minerals Push in Central Asia

On 20 May 2026 Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin told *Izvestia* that Moscow was concerned about United States and European Union efforts to secure rare-earth elements and critical minerals in Central Asia, viewing them as an attempt to weaken Russia’s position and to build Western-controlled infrastructure near its borders.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered sanctions that limited Moscow’s capacity to fund regional projects and reduced the reliability of its Northern Corridor. Central Asian states have turned to World Bank-promoted “Middle Corridor,” a route through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, which could halve travel times and triple trade by 2030.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Kazakhstan supplies about 39 % of global uranium in 2024 and 40 % in 2025, and hosts deposits of chromium, manganese, titanium, copper, zinc and rare metals. Uzbekistan produced 7 000 t of uranium in 2025, with reserves near 139 000 t, and gold, copper, tungsten, lithium and molybdenum.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

The United States and Europe seek to reduce reliance on China, which supplied 70 % of U.S. rare-earth imports (2020-2023) and imposed export bans on minerals in December 2024; in February 2026 the United States and Uzbekistan signed an Investment Framework with International Development Finance Corporation to support development. At the EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand (April 2025), Ursula von der Leyen announced a €12 billion Global Gateway package for transport, critical raw materials, energy and water management.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Beyond Galuzin’s warning, Russia secured a $16.5 billion agreement with Kazakhstan in May 2026 for Rosatom to build Kazakhstan’s nuclear power plant. Moscow plans to extend its air-defence treaty with Kyrgyzstan, underscoring continued Russian leverage in defense and nuclear sectors.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Kazakh and Uzbek officials present Western mineral partnerships as diversification, not anti-Russian moves. They argue that cooperation with the EU and United States provides processing capacity, technology transfer and economic growth while preserving security ties with Moscow.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

• U.S. rare-earth imports from China (2020-2023): 70 %

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

• Kazakhstan uranium share of global supply: 39 % (2024), 40 % (2025)

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

• Uzbekistan uranium production (2025): 7 000 t; reserves ? 139 000 t

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

• EU Global Gateway commitment: €12 billion

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Western access to Central Asian minerals and the Middle Corridor could diminish Russia’s geographic leverage, reshaping the regional order. Simultaneously, Moscow retains influence through security pacts, labor migration and energy projects, creating a multi-vector bargaining environment.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Public data on the volume of Western investment in Central Asian processing facilities remain limited, and the timeline for full operation of the Middle Corridor is not yet confirmed.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia

Analysts anticipate competition for critical-mineral supply chains, with joint ventures likely between Western financiers and Central Asian states. Russia may respond by deepening security cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan while seeking to preserve its role in nuclear and defense projects.

Russia’s Growing Critical Minerals Anxiety in Central Asia