London’s 2015 Bomb Factory and the Test of Britain’s State-Threat Designation Powers

In autumn 2015 MI5 and the Metropolitan Police raided north-west London properties, seizing three tonnes of ammonium nitrate – more explosive material than was used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing – stockpiled by a man linked to Iran-backed Hezbollah. The cache was one of the most serious terror plots foiled on British soil that decade.

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The raid came months after the UK ratified the Iran nuclear deal. Officials reportedly feared that publicising the plot could jeopardise the fragile agreement, opting for quiet handling. The decision not to name the network signalled to Iran-aligned groups that political will could be softened by diplomatic concerns.

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A Hezbollah-linked individual supplied the explosives; the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the broader state-linked threat. MI5 and the Metropolitan Police uncovered the cache. Keir Starmer pledged IRGC designation after the April Golders Green attack. Counter-terrorism specialist Roger Macmillan warned against deferral.

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Three tonnes of ammonium nitrate exceeded the amount used in the Oklahoma City bombing.

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The 2015 silence is said to have nurtured a permissive environment for Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB and Press TV, flagged for labeling British Jewish institutions as “Zionist infiltrators.” Social-media repackaging of Iranian propaganda ties it to British causes, normalising hostility toward diaspora communities and creating a pathway to radicalisation, as recent attacks by locally recruited British nationals show.

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The National Security (State Threats) Bill, passed by the Commons on 17 June, gives ministers power to designate state-linked bodies such as the IRGC, with offences carrying up to 14 years for supporting a designated group. The measure is discretionary, requiring ministers to act body by body.

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Observers argue that deferring IRGC designation under diplomatic pressure repeats the 2015 pattern, allowing threat networks to mature unchecked. Community groups contend that the earlier silence contributed to a decade of rising sectarianism and radicalisation within Britain’s Muslim communities.

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The 2015 network was never publicly identified, and no official acknowledgment of the plot was made at the time, leaving a gap in public accountability.

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• “Zionist infiltrators” — Community security groups

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• “If the IRGC and the networks that carry its message in Britain are not designated when this legislation reaches the Lords, ministers will not be deferring a difficult decision.” — Roger Macmillan, counter-terrorism specialist

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• “Quiet diplomacy was bought with public silence.” — Government insiders

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• “Soft influence does not stay soft indefinitely.” — Security analysts

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The Bill now moves to the House of Lords. Ministers must decide whether to designate the IRGC and affiliated entities before royal assent, a test of Britain’s resolve to confront state-linked terror threats.

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