Supreme Court’s 2026 Decisions Redefine Agency Independence

On June 29, 2026 the Court decided *Trump v. Slaughter* (FTC) and *Trump v. Cook* (Federal Reserve). The majority held the FTC’s for-cause removal shield violates Constitution’s separation of powers and that Congress may protect Federal Reserve governors from removal but cannot grant the Fed regulatory powers detached from monetary policy. The rulings overturn *Humphrey’s Executor* (1935).

SCOTUSblog

*Humphrey’s Executor* (1935) affirmed congressional power to insulate FTC commissioners from presidential dismissal, shifting from *Myers* (1926) that endorsed broad removal authority. Court’s skepticism appeared in *Seila Law v. CFPB* (2020). In *Slaughter*, Chief Justice John G. Roberts called the FTC’s rulemaking, adjudication and civil-suit powers fundamentally executive and emphasized that the authority to seek judicial relief is central to executive power. In *Cook*, the Court warned Congress may not assign the Fed additional regulatory powers beyond its monetary role.

SCOTUSblog(The) Atlantic

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority; Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined him. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in *Cook*, arguing the Fed’s regulatory authority makes it a de facto executive agency. Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett dissented, not addressing the Fed’s constitutionality. Atlantic calls the rulings “the ultimate triumph of the unitary executive,” arguing that independent commissions are unaccountable and that removal protections erode democratic accountability.

SCOTUSblog

The rulings enable “firings” of commissioners before a new president takes office, leaving agencies without a quorum. The FTC’s bipartisan-appointment rule—no more than three commissioners from the same party—could be bypassed if a president appoints a majority and leaves seats vacant. Scholars anticipate suits challenging the Fed’s regulatory authority, with courts applying the severance approach noted in Roberts’s footnote. Disagreement persists over whether the Fed’s regulatory functions are constitutionally executive, leaving courts to decide how to carve out any invalid powers.

SCOTUSblog

• “In our prior cases, ‘when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute’ like the one before us, we have sought to limit ‘the solution to the problem,’ severing the invalid removal provision ‘while leaving the remainder intact.’” — Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.

SCOTUSblog

• “The power to flesh out such statutory regimes—and to do so through discretionary actions, largely outside the remit of courts—is executive through and through.” — Majority opinion, *Trump v. Slaughter* (2026)

SCOTUSblog

• “As we have said many times, the “discretionary power to seek judicial relief” lies at the very core of executive authority.” — Majority opinion, *Trump v. Slaughter* (2026)

SCOTUSblog