Russia’s Ukraine War Fuels a New Wave of Organized Crime

Since the 2022 invasion, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, including up to 180,000 former convicts. Analysts warn that returning combatants, combined with expanded sanctions, could spur a more professional, militarized organized-crime sector linked to state structures.

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The post-Soviet “wild 90s” saw gangs seize banks and factories, pushing the murder rate above 33 per 100,000 (1990-94). After Vladimir Putin’s 1999 rise, the state re-centralized security and co-opted criminal networks for sanctions evasion.

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Criminologist Federico Varese (Oxford) says groups offered “private protection” where the state failed; sociologist Vadim Volkov labels the actors “violent entrepreneurs.” The Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” scheme channels selected veterans into civil service after demobilization.

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Russia’s murder rate more than doubled to over 33 per 100,000 between 1990-94. The war mobilized “hundreds of thousands” of troops, including 180,000 ex-convicts. In Colombia, demobilizing >30,000 paramilitaries led former fighters to control up to half of cocaine exports by 2011.

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Studies of post-conflict societies show that demobilized fighters bring logistics, intelligence and network skills to illicit markets. Even a modest influx of Russian veterans could raise crime groups’ sophistication, expanding cybercrime, crypto-laundering and transnational fraud.

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The Kremlin acknowledges war-related domestic fallout and has launched the “Time of Heroes” program to place veterans in public administration and political posts, aiming to harness their expertise while curbing independent criminal activity. Security services still supervise networks that aid sanctions evasion.

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Varese warns that “private protection” fills state gaps; Volkov’s “violent entrepreneurs” illustrate coercion as a commodity. Human Rights Watch notes former Colombian paramilitaries became major drug traffickers, underscoring the risk of similar Russian veteran involvement.

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Some scholars argue Russia’s stronger post-1999 state makes a wholesale resurgence of street violence unlikely, while others see the war embedding militarized crime in state structures. Precise data on veteran recruitment into illicit groups remain absent.

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• “As criminologist Federico Varese, of the University of Oxford, explains in his work, criminal groups stepped in to provide “private protection” in areas where the state was ineffective or absent.” in areas where the state was ineffective or absent.” — Federico Varese, criminologist, University of Oxford

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• “Sociologist Vadim Volkov, meanwhile, describes the rise of “violent entrepreneurs” who commodified coercion in an environment where legal institutions had largely collapsed.” who commodified coercion in an environment where legal institutions had largely collapsed.” — Vadim Volkov, sociologist

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• “A Human Rights Watch report found they became major perpetrators of drug trafficking, extortion and violence.” — Human Rights Watch

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• “Regardless of these efforts, the distinction between organized crime and state power in Russia is likely to become harder to draw than at any point since the end of the Cold War.” — Adriana Marin, lecturer, Coventry University

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Monitoring bodies will track veteran reintegration and crime-syndicate evolution, while Russia expands the “Time of Heroes” scheme. International observers urge tighter sanctions-evasion controls and social programs to curb a potential militarized underworld.

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