Full Breakdown
Anti-Drone Netting Tested on South Korean Logistics Ferry During CJLOTS 26
7/17/2026, 12:33:53 PM
Core Event: Netting Deployed on Floating Platform at Dogu Beach
On 9 July 2026, Republic of Korea (ROK) personnel operated an Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) causeway ferry at Dogu Beach, Pohang, as part of Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 26 (CJLOTS 26). Photographs released by the U.S. Department of War show a green mesh stretched over the ferry’s cargo deck. The mesh was positioned overhead and pole-supported, suggesting a passive barrier intended to impede small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) during the off-load of U.S. Marine Corps vehicles.
Background & Context: Growing Drone Threat to Amphibious Logistics
Recent conflicts have demonstrated that hostile drones can cripple resupply operations. Ukraine’s frontline logistics have suffered repeated drone strikes, prompting the wider adoption of counter-UAS measures such as ground robots and protective netting. Both North Korea and China possess sizable drone arsenals, and North Korea has reportedly received Russian assistance in drone technology. Recognizing these risks, the Pentagon’s Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) issued a February handbook urging the use of physical obstacles—fencing, netting, overhead structures—to shape drone flight paths and degrade control links.
Data & Specifications: INLS Modular Ferry Capabilities
The INLS consists of interchangeable powered and unpowered modules. A typical nine-module roll-on/roll-off discharge facility measures roughly 240 by 72 feet (73 by 22 m). Powered sections are 78–87 ft long, 24 ft wide, and draw two 800-hp Caterpillar C18 diesel engines with water-jet propulsion, achieving up to 10 knots and 16 hours of endurance. A fully assembled causeway ferry can reach about 270 ft in length and carry approximately 300 tons, enough for several LVSR trucks (each ? 53,700 lb curb weight).
Official Statements & Responses
U.S. Marine officials described the off-load as a Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise aimed at validating the 3rd Marine Logistics Group’s ability to conduct integrated logistics in complex environments. They emphasized that CJLOTS 26 integrates U.S. and ROK lighterage assets to improve combined readiness, strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance, and expand maritime sustainment capacity. U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command noted that the exercise incorporated five types of ground, maritime, and air sustainment assets and deliberately strengthened protection measures for sustainment nodes against hostile drone attacks.
Criticism & Operational Questions
Analysts question how effective the open-ended netting will be against highly maneuverable first-person-view (FPV) drones. The barrier covers only a portion of the ferry, leaving the ship, wheelhouse, and most of the deck exposed. No live-drone testing, mesh aperture data, or tensile-strength specifications have been released, and the ferry carries no visible kinetic or electronic counter-UAS systems. Consequently, the netting is viewed as a low-cost supplement rather than a standalone defense.
Verbatim Quotes
- “The offload was a Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise where 3rd Marine Logistics Group (MLG) distributes equipment from a created port of entry and provides support to III Marine Expeditionary Force units training throughout South Korea, testing and validating 3rd MLG’s ability to conduct integrated logistics operations in complex environments,” — Marines
- “CJLOTS 26 is a combined exercise designed to integrate U.S. and Republic of Korea lighterage and ship-to-shore connector capabilities, improve combined readiness, strengthen the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance, and expand combined maritime sustainment capacity during logistics operations.” — Marines
- “To enhance full-domain operational sustainment capabilities, the exercise integrated five types of ground, maritime and air sustainment assets,” — U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command
- “Reflecting evolving battlefield conditions, the training also strengthened protection measures for sustainment nodes against threats such as hostile drone attacks.” — U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command
- “Two proven ways to disrupt drones are shaping their physical environment and interfering with their signals,” — JIATF 401 handbook
Conflicting Reports & Gaps
The Marine Corps caption did not formally identify the mesh’s purpose, and some observers have suggested it could be camouflage or weather cover. No information has been released on mesh material, aperture size, or results of any live-drone trials, leaving its actual protective value unverified.
What’s Next
CJLOTS 26 placed the logistics craft itself within the drone threat model, aligning with JIATF 401’s guidance to evaluate passive barriers. While no specific follow-up exercises have been announced, the U.S. and ROK militaries are expected to continue testing and refining counter-UAS adaptations for future contested maritime logistics.
