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Full Breakdown

Trump Administration’s Draft Saudi Nuclear Deal Raises Proliferation Concerns

7/18/2026, 9:28:34 PM

Core Agreement and Status

The White House has prepared a draft “123” civil nuclear cooperation agreement that would let Saudi Arabia enrich uranium and potentially reprocess plutonium for its civilian program. The deal, finalized in negotiations that ended in October 2025, still lacks the standard Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has not been sent to Congress for the review required by law. President Donald Trump has not yet signed the agreement, and officials say the ongoing war with Iran—cited by Trump as a reason for the conflict—has contributed to the delay.

Background and Comparative Framework

U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements normally require the recipient to adopt the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which expands inspection rights. The 2009 U.S.–United Arab Emirates pact, hailed as the “gold standard,” obligates the UAE to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing and to accept full IAEA oversight. By contrast, the Saudi draft would rely on a bilateral U.S.–Saudi safeguards arrangement, limiting the IAEA’s role to “the most proliferation-sensitive areas” without the standardized protocol.

Criticism and Opposition

Several experts and members of Congress warn that the waiver could set a precedent for “bespoke” safeguards that other powers, such as Russia or China, might emulate. Andrea Stricker, deputy director of nonproliferation work at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, warned that without the Additional Protocol the IAEA “would have fewer rights to go to (inspect suspected) undeclared sites.” She also noted the risk that Saudi technicians could transfer centrifuge expertise to secret facilities, drawing a parallel to Pakistan’s program after Abdul Qadeer Khan’s proliferation activities.

Official Statements & Responses

Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced in October 2025 that the United States and Saudi Arabia had “come together on a deal for civil nuclear cooperation,” emphasizing a “firm commitment to nonproliferation.” The administration’s 2025 waiver report to Congress claims the bilateral safeguards “employ additional safeguards and verification measures” for enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing, though the specific terms remain unpublished.

Verbatim Quotes

  • “Together, with bilateral safeguard agreements, we want to grow our partnership, bring American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and keep a firm commitment to nonproliferation.” — Chris Wright, Energy Secretary
  • “The Additional Protocol was explicitly designed to give the IAEA more access after it became clear that (basic) comprehensive safeguards agreements were insufficient” — Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association
  • “If you don’t have the Additional Protocol in place, then the IAEA would have fewer rights to go to (inspect suspected) undeclared sites,” — Andrea Stricker, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
  • “the absence of an Additional Protocol as, by itself, cause for alarm.” — Dan Joyner, nuclear regulatory consultant and law professor, University of Alabama