Trump Administration Sends Saudi Nuclear Deal to Congress

The White House submitted a 30-year U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for the 90-day review required under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The deal, signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman on July 22, would permit U.S. firms to develop Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear infrastructure. The agreement can take effect unless a joint resolution rejecting it is passed during the review period; it does not require a two-thirds Senate vote.

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President Donald Trump attached a retroactive condition that the deal will proceed only if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, a stipulation that has not been altered. The agreement does not incorporate the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, a safeguard present in the 2009 UAE “gold-standard” deal. Saudi Arabia has already solicited bids from Russian, Chinese, French and South Korean firms for its first two reactors, indicating the program would continue regardless of U.S. participation. The administration argues the pact will meet Saudi domestic energy needs and open a market that could generate “tens of billions of dollars” and thousands of U.S. jobs, while also securing cooperation in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, AI and critical minerals.

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Energy Secretary Wright stated the agreement is intended to satisfy Saudi Arabia’s electricity demand, freeing more oil for export. The White House has emphasized that the nuclear component is strictly civilian, though the text does not permanently bar enrichment. The analysis on ResponsibleStatecraft notes that the deal omits the “gold-standard” requirement that bans domestic enrichment and reprocessing and lacks the IAEA Additional Protocol, raising concerns about future weaponization pathways.

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Nonproliferation experts, supporters of Israel and several Democratic lawmakers argue the safeguards are insufficient. Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), co-chair of the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, warned that the agreement lacks the most stringent protections against a Saudi nuclear weapons program. Critics also point to the contradiction of the U.S. having launched a war on Iran to prevent its enrichment while enabling Saudi capabilities.

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• “If the Trump administration wants to stop a Saudi bomb, it should require the nonproliferation Gold Standard, which would ban enrichment and reprocessing and require International Atomic Energy Agency additional protocol safeguards in Saudi Arabia. If Riyadh did not want a bomb, it would accept the Gold Standard,” — Sen. Ed Markey

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