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North Korea Cites U.S. Buildup and Dismisses IAEA Denuclearization Calls

By Drooid · · How we work

Core Event: DPRK Leaders Reject International Denuclearization Demands and Justify Nuclear Expansion

On September 17, 2026, Vice Defence Minister Kim Kang Il told the Beijing Xiangshan Forum that a “growing U.S.–led military buildup” and an “expanding nuclear alliance” among the United States, South Korea and Japan justify Pyongyang’s decision to continue strengthening its nuclear deterrent. In the same week, Kim Yo-jong, sister of Kim Jong Un and director of the Workers’ Party’s General Affairs Department, issued a KCNA statement rejecting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) call for North Korea’s denuclearisation, calling the agency’s remarks “familiar silly talk” and asserting the DPRK’s nuclear status is “absolute and irreversible.” A DPRK Ministry of National Defence spokesperson warned that recent U.S.–South Korean weapons-of-mass-destruction (CWMD) talks could trigger the country’s nuclear-force policy law.

Background & Context

The 70th IAEA General Conference in Vienna raised concerns about North Korea’s expanding uranium-enrichment capacity and urged Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programme in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible” manner. Earlier, on September 10, 2026, U.S. and South Korean defence officials met in Seoul to discuss joint CWMD response mechanisms, a meeting the DPRK described as an “open declaration of confrontation.” A recent Freedom Shield joint exercise demonstrated continued U.S.–South Korean military coordination in the region.

Key Figures & Groups

  • Kim Kang Il – Vice Defence Minister, speaker at the Xiangshan Forum.
  • DPRK Ministry of National Defence spokesperson – Linked CWMD talks to possible invocation of the nuclear-force law.
  • Stephen Biegun – Former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, noted the DPRK’s “muted response.”
  • Lim Eul-chul – Professor, Kyungnam University, described the statements as part of a broader messaging campaign.

Timeline

  • Freedom Shield exercise – Recent joint drill by the United States and South Korea.
  • September 10, 2026 – U.S. and South Korean defence officials meet in Seoul on CWMD cooperation.
  • September 17, 2026 – Kim Kang Il speaks at the Xiangshan Forum; Kim Yo-jong releases KCNA statement rejecting IAEA calls.

Data & Statistics

The IAEA Director General reported an expansion of North Korea’s uranium-enrichment capacity and continued operation of key nuclear facilities, though no specific quantitative figures were provided.

Official Statements & Responses

The DPRK asserted its nuclear status is “physically and legally permanent” and that any perceived escalation by the United States, South Korea or Japan warrants a “solid nuclear shield” and could justify invoking its 2022 nuclear-force policy law. The spokesperson framed the U.S.–South Korean CWMD meeting as a “brazen declaration of confrontation.”

U.S. officials described the CWMD talks as routine coordination to improve response capabilities. Stephen Biegun added that a future meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un would not be surprising, especially after the upcoming APEC summit in China.

Why It Matters / Impact

The DPRK’s framing of its nuclear arsenal as an irreversible defensive necessity heightens diplomatic friction and complicates multilateral non-proliferation efforts. By linking U.S.–South Korean security cooperation to potential legal triggers for nuclear use, North Korea signals a willingness to expand its deterrent posture, raising the risk of miscalculation in an already volatile region.

Conflicting Reports & Gaps

No independent verification exists for the DPRK’s claim that the United States is conducting biological-weapon activities in Ukraine or at U.S. Forces Korea bases. The exact legal provisions the DPRK might invoke remain unspecified, leaving a gap in understanding how such a declaration would translate into concrete action.