Full Breakdown
The Expanding Long-Range Drone Arms Race in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict
By Drooid · · How we work
Core Event: Surge in Deep-Strike Drone Operations
On 20 September, Ukrainian forces launched a coordinated strike that disabled a Moscow refinery about 300 miles from the border. The attack involved the Raid regiment of the Unmanned System Forces and used “Fire Point” FP-2 drones—6-metre-winged, 100 kg-payload craft—capable of reaching targets over 200 miles inside Russian-held territory. Russia has fielded jet-powered variants of the Iranian-origin Shahed (Geran-4 and Geran-5) that travel at 300–600 km/h, blurring the line between drone and cruise-missile capabilities.
Background & Context
Ukraine’s drone programme accelerated after the 2022 invasion, with the FP-1 (? $75,000) and its successor FP-2 first publicly acknowledged in September 2025. These platforms target logistics hubs, warehouses and refineries to disrupt Russian supply lines.
Russia initially relied on imported Iranian Shahed drones (Geran-2) but, since May 2026, has introduced jet-engine upgrades. The Geran-4 reaches up to 550 km/h; the Geran-5 about 600 km/h, comparable to light cruise missiles such as the Banderol. Production forecasts anticipate 36,000 jet-powered Shaheds in 2027, alongside 10,000 Banderols and a similar number of Dan-T cruise missiles.
Official Statements & Responses
“Both sides are getting better at translating deep strikes into economic effects,” says Sidharth Kaushal, of the Royal United Services Institute.
“Russia has advantages that Ukraine does not,” Kaushal adds, noting a broader array of long-range weapons and a denser air-defence network.
Ukrainian drone commander Skipper observes, “This spring we had a really nice time and almost every night we could see one, two, three, four systems destroyed.” He later cautions that “they are just hiding” as Russian jamming improves.
On-the-Ground Reports
Znakhar, a 33-year-old former software coder, plans flights on a $25,000 Sych drone, adjusting routes to avoid populated areas and known Russian interceptor sites. He notes a recent increase in Russian drone activity.
Ananas, a former 3D artist, says night-time launches now occur from underground shelters, and his video-game experience aids piloting the FP-2.
Conflicting Reports & Gaps
Sources differ on the effectiveness of Ukraine’s interceptor drones. The Guardian notes a decline in interception rates to 60 % against jet-powered Shaheds, while the Kyiv Independent emphasizes that rain, fog and low clouds impair visual targeting, suggesting the drop may be temporary. No definitive data on the overall success rate of Ukrainian deep-strike missions against Russian economic targets is provided.
What’s Next
Russia plans to mass-produce 36,000 jet-powered Shaheds in 2027 and continue fielding both fast and piston-engine models through the winter. Ukraine must accelerate development of faster interceptor drones capable of 450 km/h or greater and expand the use of scarce fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles. Both sides face resource constraints: Ukraine’s war budget is overspent and seeks an additional £40 bn for the next year, while Russia may mobilise up to 300,000 men after its parliamentary elections.
The evolving drone arms race underscores a battlefield where speed, altitude and electronic warfare increasingly determine the reach and impact of each side’s long-range strike capability.
