Full Breakdown
Lunar Nuclear Power Race: United States, Russia and China Target Moon Bases
By Drooid · · How we work
In this breakdown
01
Background & Context
All three space powers view nuclear reactors as the most reliable energy source for sustained activity at the lunar south pole, where permanently shadowed craters contain water ice. Solar panels generate power only half the time, and batteries or diesel would be prohibitively expensive because every kilogram must be launched from Earth. Extracted ice could be turned into breathable oxygen and rocket fuel, making a nuclear-powered base a strategic prerequisite for long-term habitation.
Watch
Related reporting
brightcove
Why are US, Russia and China racing to put nuclear reactors on the moon?
02
Key Figures & Groups
- President Donald Trump – issued a December 2025 executive order directing NASA to develop a lunar reactor ready for launch by 2030.
- NASA – responsible for the “Lunar Reactor 1” project.
- Simon Middleburgh – director of Bangor University’s Nuclear Futures Institute.
- Antonino Salmeri – director of the Lunar Policy Platform.
- Norbert Schorghofer – senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute.
- Russian-Chinese partnership – developing the “Selena” reactor for a Chinese-led base.
Visual evidence
Images from the story
03
Data & Statistics
- U.S. reactor (Lunar Reactor 1) – 20 kW output, mass under 6,000 kg, sized for a 3.7 m × 5.5 m launch compartment, designed for five years of autonomous operation.
- Russian-Chinese “Selena” reactor – 10 kW output, mass 1,100–1,300 kg, engineered for a ten-year maintenance-free lifespan, slated for a base by 2036.
- Historical precedent – the Soviet Union launched more than 30 nuclear fission reactors into Earth orbit (late-1960s to 1980s); the United States has spent $20 billion on advanced space-nuclear programmes but has not launched a reactor since a 1965 experiment that failed after 43 days.
04
Official Statements & Responses
Middleburgh emphasized that solar power cannot meet the continuous demand of a lunar base and that nuclear power is “the obvious choice,” provided it is used responsibly. He cited regulatory framework, launch-vehicle availability, and safe landing as the main hurdles.
Salmeri noted that a lunar reactor can be lawful under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty if it adheres to peaceful-use principles and avoids harmful contamination. He warned that a reactor’s presence could create a de-facto “safety zone” that blocks other actors.
Schorghofer affirmed that treaty signatories retain the right to mine lunar resources for peaceful purposes, stressing that the competition is about securing access to water ice rather than asserting sovereignty.
The December 2025 executive order tasks NASA with delivering a launch-ready reactor by the end of 2030, aligning the United States with Russia’s 2036 target and China’s broader lunar-base timeline.
05
Criticism & Opposition
Analysts cite the 1978 Kosmos 954 incident, in which a Soviet satellite’s reactor scattered radioactive material over northern Canada, as a cautionary precedent. They argue a malfunctioning lunar reactor could create a localized contamination zone, though the effects would remain on the Moon.
Legal scholars point out that existing liability regimes were never designed for long-term hazardous equipment on another celestial body, leaving responsibility for accidents ambiguous.
06
Conflicting Reports & Gaps
Sources agree on the basic specifications of the U.S. and Russian-Chinese reactors, but no outlet provides a definitive timeline for the actual lunar landing and activation. While the treaty’s prohibition on territorial claims is clear, the legal status of “safety zones” created by reactor installations remains unsettled, highlighting a gap in international space-law frameworks.